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Faye M. Kert, Privateering: Patriots and Profits in the War of 1812.
Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2015. Pp. 224.
In recent years, historical work on the nature of the public-private
partnership underpinning the fiscal-military state, and the role of
merchant-contractors within it, have reached such a pitch that the
term ‘the Contractor State’ has emerged as a scholarly concept.
Privateering has received rather less attention. It is the purpose
of Faye M. Kert’s Privateering: Patriots and Profits in the War of
1812 to remedy this deficiency. By examining the legal and political
infrastructure and the economic imperatives and incentives behind
privateering operations, Kert’s work complements recent research
into the close and often militarily vital links between commercial
activities and military operations. Drawing on a wide range of
material, albeit with justifiable emphasis towards North American
archives, Kert includes detailed geographic data on private vessels
and number of prizes in the appendix and the bibliographical
‘Essay on Sources’ accompanying each chapter testifies to the rigor,
breadth and depth of scholarship. A prodigious body of empirical
research is distilled into a concise and pointed account that will
appeal to scholars, military professionals, and educated laymen
alike (pp. 191-198).
The book is a lively account of an under-researched topic. In a field
dominated by voluminous histories of naval battles, Grand Strategy,
and the impact of new technology, privateering has often appeared
as a sideshow to more important themes and events. Recent work on
Salem indicates that belated attention is now being paid to it, albeit
from slightly outside established scholarly circles. The author has
previously written about the inter-related mercantile communities of
Canadian colonial privateers and her scholarly credentials are fully
displayed by her carefully plotted account, underscored by crisp,
clear prose and rigorous analysis. Six concise chapters examining
different aspects of privateering during the war are book-ended by a
commendably brief but incisive introduction and conclusion locating
the subject within the wider history of the war. The divisions and
rivalries between American states and their diverse geo-political and
economic objectives provide important historical context allowing for
measured evaluation of the granular detail of privateering operations.
The legal, ethical, and philosophical framework is well drawn,
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accompanied by coherent and often colourful descriptions, though
Kert commendably resists the temptation to romanticise her subject.
Privateering was a wartime activity with medieval antecedents,
created and legally sanctioned by maritime states to protect and
defend commerce from enemy attack. It was initiated by a declaration
of war followed by a Prize Act. A Letter of Marque, effectively a
governmental licence, differentiated privateering from piracy, its
disreputable and unruly relation, in stipulating ships were to be
legally “subdued, seized and taken”. As a temporary economic
weapon privateering was deceptively anarchic, and was in fact highlyregulated and prescribed by international law. The evolution of its
legal and operational infrastructure was accompanied by theoretical
justification with writers such as Vattel accepting that warring nations
had the right to deprive their enemies of the means of waging war.
Yet privateering sat uneasily alongside the rights of neutral states.
The age-old debate on neutral versus belligerent rights assumed
particular importance for the United States during the Revolutionary
and Napoleonic wars, with British Orders-in-Council, legislative acts
restraining international trade, and a constant threat to neutral
shipping. While extolling the orthodox view that with repeal of the
legislation, the 1812 war was an “unnecessary conflict” Kert correctly
holds that the rationale for the war in American minds, exorcised by
commercial restraints and naval impressment, of ‘Free Trade and
Sailors’ Rights’ was a powerful one.
By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the
capability of privateers was arguably greater, for larger armed forces
not only meant greater military capability and strength but increased
vulnerability. In 1812, the scale and scope of privateering was
indeed impressive. Both sides inflicted and suffered losses but with
638 American privateers, mostly operating out of Massachusetts,
Maryland, New York, and Maine, against 45 British privateers, mostly
from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, Britain faced potentially
catastrophic losses. Presciently predicting the nature and course of
the war, Thomas Jefferson stated in August 1812 that Britain’s fleet
would “annihilate our public force on the water, but our privateers will
eat out the vitals of their commerce” (p. 70). Kert demonstrates the
weaknesses for a commercial nation conducting a maritime war, with
extensive British losses reflected in insurance rates 30 percent higher
in 1815 than in 1812 (p. 15). Equally, despite the cost of converting
merchant ships into privateers the prospect of potential gains appear
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to have been worth the risk for many ship-owners, investors, and crew.
Privateering required an intricate legal and administrative structure
consisting of multiple officials and jurisdictions in adjudicating and
presiding over prize claims. Revenue duties and legal costs diminished
profit margins but Kert convincingly demonstrates that prize capture
remained profitable especially early in the war.
The damage American privateers inflicted on British commerce
was not sustained, for the naval blockade of New England in early
1813 and compulsory convoys curbed early successes and halted
American maritime traffic. The hordes of privateers at sea during the
first six months of the war steadily dwindled thereafter. Privateering
was only viable so long as there were ships to capture and money to be
made, and the clear corollary between perceptions of profitability and
number of active privateers underlines the view that profit generally
trumped patriotism, and as the war developed “the combined risk of
physical and financial loss proved a powerful deterrent” (p. 110). Only
16 of 600 American vessels renewed their commissions throughout
1812-1814. The ideal scenario of swift, non-violent capture by a
larger force with easily achieved gains was atypical. Only a handful
made fortunes; thousands more ended up injured, imprisoned, or
dead. The vicissitudes of privateering, including accidents, disease,
incompetence, ill-discipline, and insubordination all impinged on
operations, and successful vessels and crew faced a constant threat of
capture, destruction, and ruin.
The complexity of the subject often means that broad generalities
are fraught with difficulty. For example, the strategic value of
privateering is difficult to ascertain and Kert provides somewhat
contradictory evidence. The absence of coordination with the Navy
limited the strategic importance of privateering but seizure of goods
always had the potential to undermine the enemy, and was a powerful
and legitimate weapon against a commercial nation. The capture of
a British transport ship in 1814 loaded with military items intended
for the British fleet at Lake Ontario was a case in point, representing
“a major setback for the British war effort on the Great Lakes” (p.
133). Kert’s argument that privateer activity helped convince Britain
that war was too costly is underpinned by the reasonable assumption
that the small us navy would not have been able to prolong the war
“had privateers not kept the war at sea alive” (p. 147). Yet Kert
concedes that while episodically significant, the overall strategic value
of privateering was highly-variable and somewhat limited. Indeed, the
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commercial and strategic imperatives could work the other way, with
the search for profits leading to extensive smuggling, and American
merchants seizing the opportunity to supply British troops during the
Peninsular War.
While somewhat implicit within the text, Kert may have
considered privateering more closely alongside elements of ‘informal’
warfare. Recent work on logistics and provisioning has demonstrated
the importance of non-military actors towards military operations.
With a clearer understanding of the multi-faceted relationship between
mercantile activity, in its many guises, and warfare, the ‘business
of war’ has never been more pronounced in historical scholarship.
Despite this conceptual omission, by offering new insights based
on meticulous research, Kert convincingly accords long-overdue
recognition and commensurate historical significance to her subject
as a vital element of military activity in the war of 1812. Privateering
appears in the guise of innovative entrepreneurship, albeit of an
unpredictable, dangerous and potentially violent and destructive
character. While the insightful biographical aspects may have been
taken even further, the importance of human agency is forcefully and
convincingly reiterated. In that sense, the book complements recent
work on the economics of warfare in acknowledging the intricate
blend of public and private interests, in addition to and alongside
regular armies and navies, of militarized societies at war in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.1 More broadly, the role of the
Canadian dimension of the war in forging future Canadian identity
ensures that the work is an important addition to existing literature
on the historical legacy of warfare and the continuing reverberations
of the 1812 war in the popular consciousness of Canada’s ‘collective
memory.’
Gordon Bannerman, International Correspondence Schools Ltd.

1
  Roger Knight and Martin Wilcox, Sustaining the Fleet, 1793-1815: War, the
British Navy and the Contractor State (Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK: The Boydell
Press, 2010); Janet MacDonald, The British Navy’s Victualling Board, 1793-1815:
management competence and incompetence (Woodbridge, Suffolk: The Boydell
Press, 2010); David Parrott, The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military
Revolution in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2012).
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